Legal production of illegality in a comparative perspective. The cases of Malaysia and Spain by Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
ORIGINAL PAPER
Legal production of illegality in a comparative
perspective. The cases of Malaysia and Spain
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
Published online: 30 May 2010
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Most studies on illegal migration focus on particular national or local
settings and most theoretical approaches are built upon research done in America
and Western Europe. In consequence, there is little understanding about the legal
construction of the ‘illegal’ and the meanings of migrants’ illegality in different
political contexts. Given these major shortcomings, this article compares the cases of
Malaysia and Spain. By comparing how we can explain illegal immigration and
what it means to be illegal in each country, the final aim of this article is to place the
term ‘illegal’ back into its context, that is, to understand the ‘illegal’ not as an
essentialised, generic and singular object but rather as a legal and political product of
particular historical and national contexts.
Introduction
Illegal migration has become a permanent phenomenon in many countries. The
International Organisation for Migration estimates that illegal immigrants may
account for one third to one half of new entrants into developed countries, marking
an increase of 20% over the past 10 years. In the European Union alone estimates
suggest that the inflow might amount to 500,000 illegal migrants annually. Although
there are no estimates at the regional level for Southeast Asia or Asia in general,
countries such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan or India experience high levels of illegal
migration from other neighbouring countries. In Malaysia alone, for instance, one
million illegal migrants (in a population of 27 million) have been estimated in the
past years. Following this development, illegal migration has become prominent, if
not foremost, in much contemporary academic and public debate as well as policy
thinking around migration. In Europe and Asia it is receiving wider attention as
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stricter measures are being adopted to reduce it. New initiatives are also being taken
to supplement or reinforce existing regional and international instruments dealing
with different aspects of illegal migration.
Despite its central place on national and international agendas and academic
debates, most studies on illegal migration focus on particular national and local
settings, and most theoretical approaches are built upon research done in North
America and Western Europe. These two features are at the basis of the two main
pitfalls of the literature on illegal migration. First, there is little understanding about
the legal and political construction of the ‘illegal’ and how this relates with particular
politics of nationalism and citizenship or, more broadly, with the constantly
redefined boundaries of particular nation-states. Second, migrants’ illegality is often
understood as if it was the same everywhere. However, as debated and shown in the
ASEF Workshop on illegal migration in Asia and Europe (Kuala Lumpur, January
2008), illegal migration differs in many ways. It differs in the way it is produced. For
instance, in countries with very restrictive migration policies, illegal migration
results in great measure from the impossibility to enter the country legally. It also
differs in the way it is defined. Although the illegal migrant is seldom defined in
national law (Guild 2004), migration policies place the illegal migrant in very
different situations. For instance, while in some countries illegal migrants are
completely ignored or refused as social and political subjects, in other countries they
are entitled to work or have access to health care and education.
Given these major shortcomings, this article compares the cases of Malaysia and
Spain. These two countries are similar in that both countries have had a huge
demand for foreign labour in the last two decades. At the same time, they are
different in the way how their governments have responded to these demands. While
Malaysia launched a guest worker programme from the early 1990s on, Spain opted
to implement a rather restrictive entry policy. Despite this diversity, both countries
have experienced sizeable illegal migration flows. Given these similarities and
differences, a question emerges about how we can explain illegal immigration and
what illegal means in such different policy contexts. By considering these two
questions, this article aims to place the term illegal migrant back into the context, that
is, to understand the ‘illegal’ not as an essentialised, generic and singular object but
rather as a legal and political product of particular historical and national contexts.
Law and illegal migration
The link between law and illegal migration has been commonly observed. The most
common approach has been to explain illegal immigration as a result of an
ineffective and powerless law. Internalising the mores and norms of the modern state
by portraying the law as a force that bars illegal entry and sojourn rather than as a
process that defines who and what is illegal (Coutin 1996: 11), this approach focuses
on the degree to which policies are capable of stemming illegal immigration. In
consequence, the conclusion is simple: illegal migration proves the ineffectiveness of
migration policies. In other words, if illegal migration continues to ‘take place’ and
‘illegal migrants’ continue ‘to be’ present in contemporary societies despite
increasing border enforcement and more internal control, this means that policies
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do not work. This perceived failure of migration policies (or gap between policy
goals and outcomes) is explained by referring to the high cost of enforcement, the
economic role of illegal labour, the public unwillingness to punish migrants’
illegality or the strength of the macro-structural forces of migration (Cornelius and
Tsuda 2004: 9).
A second way to approach this link has been by focusing on how the law serves
the interests of powerful economic and political groups, basically the need of
capitalists and capitalism. From this perspective, migration policies are not analysed
in their attempt to reduce illegal migration but rather in their function to place illegal
migrants in a more exploitable position. In other words, the criminalisation of illegal
migrants is understood as a way to construct and preserve the immigrants’ otherness
on which their condition as a cheap and flexible labour force rests (Portes 1977: 474;
Sassen 1988: 7; Calavita 2005: 46). Finally, in a less deterministic way, more recent
studies have initiated what we could call a third approach to the legal production of
migrants’ illegality (De Genova 2002; Coutin 2000; 2005). The question here is how
immigration law constitutes individuals within immigration categories. In this
regard, more effective migration policies do not mean less illegal migration (as
assumed by the first set of studies) but rather an improvement on the state’s ability to
constitute categories of differentiation. The law creates thus the subjects that on the
surface it seeks to bar. Whether these subjects constitute a cheap and flexible labour
force is more an empirical question than a starting point of inquiry.
If the law creates the category of the illegal, the following question is what does it
mean to be categorised as ‘illegal’. Following Coutin, illegality means ‘a space of
forced invisibility, exclusion, subjugation and repression’ (Coutin 2000: 30). This
non-existence is imposed to migrants by dimensions such as the delimitation of
reality to that which can be documented; the temporalisation of presence, being the
possibility of regularisation dependent on being able to prove their illegal residence;
‘legal aconsanguinity’, as certain kinship ties are nullified by immigration policies;
‘enforced clandestinity’; and restricted physical and social mobility (Coutin 2000:
30–33). In a similar way, De Genova (2002: 438–439) defines migrants’ illegality as
that space determined by a palpable sense of deportability, that is, by the possibility
of being removed from the space of the nation-state. What defines illegality is not
deportation but rather the possibility of deportation, that is, the fact that some are
deported while most remain (undeported). According to De Genova, this deport-
ability reproduces the physical borders of nation-states in the migrants’ everyday life
and, by so doing, constructs a spatialised and racialised social condition that would
indeed sustain the vulnerability and tractability of illegal migrants as workers.
By focusing on the legal construction of ‘illegality’ as immigration category, this
third approach reveals as well how immigrants themselves use law to claim, contest
and reject these legal identities. In her study on Salvadorian migrants in the USA,
Coutin (2005: 23) observes how they challenge the attribution of illegality by
arguing that they migrated to the United States out of necessity, that they were
participating and thus were integrated in US society or that the US economy
benefited from their labour. Similarly, Kyle and Siracusa (2005) show how
Ecuadorian migrants in Spain were aware of breaking immigration law but rejected
the idea that this made their venture illegal. To justify it, these migrants referred to
the responsibility of the Ecuadorian state elite, defined as a powerful mafia running a
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predatory state, and to the historical responsibility of Spain as coloniser of Latin
America. In other words, using Van Schendel’s and Abraham’s terms (2005), their
main claim was that their movement and stay in Spain was illegal but licit, that is,
considered illegitimate by the state but claimed as legitimate by themselves. While
these authors have noted how the attribution of illegality has been contested by
migrants’ discourse, other scholars have focused on how individual and collective
coping strategies of the migrants themselves, non-governmental organisations and
sympathetic civil servants have opened up loopholes for illegal immigrants in an
increasingly protected job market or welfare state (for instance, see van der Leun
2003).
Although this third approach has brought important insights on the (contested)
meanings and implications of migrants’ illegality, it has shifted the focus away from
the causes underlying illegal migration. Trying to bring it back, the question that
remains to be answered is how to explain illegal migration. Is illegal migration, as
argued by Cornelius and Tsuda, a result of ineffective, failed or inherently flawed
immigration policies? Is illegal migration, as argued by Portes, Sassen and Calavita,
a way to create a cheap and flexible labour force? Another question that remains to
be considered is whether illegal migration ‘exists’ and ‘is’ the same everywhere.
Most approaches on illegal migration assume that illegality leads to the most
subordinated form of legal existence (basically because of the non-legal existence of
illegal migrants) and therefore to the cheapest and most flexible type of labour force.
The logic behind this argument is that the more illegal a migrant is, the less rights
(thus the more vulnerable position) he or she has. However, as we will see in this
article, this correlation does not seem to apply everywhere. Since the contours of
illegality mirror those of legality, the meaning of illegality depends on that of
migrants’ legality.
Two different labour migration policy models
Both Malaysia and Spain have presented huge foreign labour demands since the late
1980s on. Given these demands, both states have responded by setting up particular
migration policies. In the case of Malaysia, these policies have sought to open entry
while restricting membership. As has happened with any other guest worker
programme, the Malaysian State did not restrict the entry of migrant workers but has
placed limits on time of residence, position in the labour market and social and
labour rights. In contrast, the Spanish State opted for a particularly restrictive entry
policy until 2005. While demands for labour kept growing throughout the 1990s, the
government did not respond accordingly by adjusting its immigration policy to let in
greater numbers of workers. Hence, in Spain there was a clear contrast between the
economics and politics of immigration.
In order to explain the high-numbers policy in Malaysia one would need to refer
not only to the role of employers in immigration policymaking but also to the
development-oriented project of the State of Malaysia. The New Economic Policy
(1971–1990), and its subsequent derivations, sought to restructure the legacy of
colonial society by means of promoting economic growth. While social programmes
aimed at situating the Malay in a better position in the labour market, economic
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growth continued to depend on cheap labour. In this context, there was (and there
still is) general consensus that employment of migrant workers was necessary for
both social stability and economic growth. In Spain, in contrast, the nature of
immigration policies arose from very different priorities. First, the demand for
closure was determined by European Union requirements. Second, given that
unemployment figures had risen to over 20% by the mid-1990s, immigration
policies tended to guarantee protection for national workers more than to heed the
employers’ demands. Finally, some of the restrictive aspects of Spanish immigration
policy should be understood in relation with the fact that the policies did not work
well and, more specifically, with the slowness of procedures and the—politically—
much-vaunted myth of recruitment in the countries of origin.
However, to conclude that Malaysia is characterised by an open entry policy and
Spain by a restrictive one would mean remaining on the surface of things or settling
for an analysis of written policy and its implementation without inquiring into its
effects. This distinction between the law in the books and the law in practise is
especially significant in the Spanish case. In Malaysia, the immigration policies
produced what they claimed, in other words, many immigrants with very few rights.
The opposite happened in Spain. Despite the restrictiveness of its immigration
policies, immigrants kept coming in all the same. As many scholars and the
stakeholders themselves (starting from the leading political parties) have noted, the
mismatch between significant demands for foreign labour and highly restrictive
entry policies led to an out-and-out model of illegal immigration (Izquierdo 1996:
37; Solanes 2001: 82; Arango and Sandell 2004: 25; Calavita 2005: 12; Finotelli
2007: 3). In this regard, if one focuses on how the labour demands were covered in
practise, one would conclude that, in Spain, too, the demand for labour led to a
situation of high numbers and low rights: high numbers in the sense that employers
got as many migrant workers as wanted; low rights in the sense that, in their capacity
as ‘illegal’, immigrant workers entered the country and worked without having a
legal existence, which means without minimal social and labour rights, and without
the fact of their presence affording access to permanent residence or citizenship. In
short, as with the case of workers in Malaysia, those in Spain also ‘entered’ but,
once ‘inside’, they were still ‘outside’ in any social, labour-related and symbolic
sense.
Joint analysis of entry policies and regularisation programmes would, in fact, lead
one to a similar conclusion, although there is one further nuance. The Spanish
regularisation programmes operated for a long time as the real entry policy. Until
2005, legal entry (as an immigrant worker) was so difficult that people usually
entered the country, stayed on and worked illegally until eventually becoming
regularised. In this regard, one might conclude that, while entry policies were
particularly restrictive, the mechanisms of regularisation ended up making entry
relatively open. However, entry via regularisation has always meant deferment since
an immigrant could only opt for regularisation if he or she had been illegal. Making
illegality a requisite for legality meant that those who entered the country had to
come in with very few rights. As noted above, this was a policy of high numbers and
low rights. The difference in this case is that once they were regularised and after
some years of conditional residence, most of the immigrants ended up obtaining a
permanent residence permit or even Spanish citizenship. In other words, in the long
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term, the regularisation policy eventually led to a situation of high numbers and high
rights.
Finally, to conclude this account of the Spanish model, 2005 represented a major
change in policy. Along with a final regularisation process that involved almost
700,000 applications, the government finally switched to a relatively open entry
policy. The main reason for this, as had repeatedly been proclaimed by the
government (of different political parties) in the previous few years, was the aim of
legally channelling immigration so as to cut down the numbers of illegal immigrants.
In fact, the combination of illegal immigration and the periodical regularisation
processes could not continue ad infinitum without undermining the legitimacy of the
state inasmuch as it had to be seen to be fulfilling its role of controlling immigration
flows. Accordingly, in order to avoid what we might define as continuous correction
of a non-functioning migratory system, the government at last opted for an entry
policy that was more visibly in keeping with demands for foreign workers. The
result was a policy of high numbers and conditioned rights which, over the years, led
as well to a situation characterised by high numbers and high rights.
The state’s production of illegality
Despite so different labour migration policy models, both Malaysia and Spain are
clear examples of a state’s production of illegality. By the state’s production of
illegality I do not mean, as other authors have argued (see, for example, Calavita
2005), that the non-legal recognition of the immigrant’s existence and work seeks to
create a cheap, flexible labour force. It is true that borders might be instrumental in
this. Yet the state’s production of illegality is much more than this. It is linked with
the intractable antagonism between demands for migrant labour and demands for
closure. Attempts have been made to find a solution to this dilemma in both
Malaysia and Spain: in Malaysia by limiting rights instead of numbers, in Spain by
limiting numbers instead of rights. In both cases, these attempts have been made
with the conviction and intention that migrant labour could be ‘imported’,
controlled, limited and, where necessary, ‘exported’ at will. However, labour is
not, and never has been, just a commodity. In neither of the two cases, with or
without rights, has the state succeeded in commodifying migrant labour. The first
and foremost result of this ‘failed’ attempt has been the creation of the illegal
immigrant or what others (see Cornelius and Tsuda 2004) have dubbed a gap
between migration policies and outcomes.
In the Malaysian case, illegality has been the result, first, of a bureaucratised and
commercialised border. Entering Malaysia as a foreign worker has involved a great
deal of red tape and paying out for an endless series of papers with the governments
in the countries of origin as well as the Malaysian embassies. Moreover, the
existence of a chain of intermediaries (the so-called recruitment agencies) has only
increased the costs of a journey which, for people just across the border, are
exorbitant and unnecessary. Due to the bureaucratisation and commercialisation of
the border, illegal entry has represented for would-be immigrants in nearby zones a
much faster and cheaper option. Second, control over immigrants has clashed with
the interests of employers who want a more flexible and also permanent workforce,
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that means, access to foreign labour whenever and for as long as required. Then
again, there is the resistance of immigrants to being turned into a flexible and
temporary labour to be imported and exported at will (see Garcés-Mascareñas 2006,
2008).
In the case of Spain, the state’s production of illegality resulted from two different
processes. First, as noted above, the mismatch between the economics and politics of
migration led to nothing less than an outright model of illegal immigration. This
mismatch is related with the national interest of the restrictionist but also with a
bureaucracy that was unable to cope with burgeoning and ‘unforeseen’ requests for
entry. Second, the policy of periodical regularisations both reduced and produced
illegality. If each regularisation campaign was launched with the aim of taking
the illegality count back to zero, each regularisation process produced new or
recurrent illegality. This must be explained by the fact that until 2001 time of
residence rather than holding a job was the main requisite for regularisation, while
with the first renovation after a year holding a job rather than residence was the chief
requirement for maintaining legal status. What ended up creating illegality, then, was
the combination of relative (though deferred) open entry by means of regularisation
and the preservation of a form of conditioned membership. In other words, illegality
(or what Spanish scholars have called ‘relapse into illegality’) was the aftermath of a
regularisation policy that applied to residents and a renovation policy that only
covered workers with a (formally recognised) job.
It might be asserted that any kind of regulation entails its opposite or, to put it
slightly differently, legality bears illegality within it. While this may be true, I wish
to take the argument somewhat further. In particular, this study shows how it is
precisely ‘the illusion’ of considering and treating immigrants only as workers, as
manpower that can be imported, kept under constraints and exported at will, that
produces this illegality. The reason for this is simply that the condition of immigrants
is much more than that of mere bracero (arm-men in English) or of a commodity
that can be subjected to barriers, tariffs and limits. This does not mean that borders
and state control do not matter. In fact, illegality is proof of their existence and
relevance. It means, rather, that illegality—and this is the main thrust of my
argument—should not be explained in outside terms but from within, from the
context of immigration policy itself and the contradictions besetting the nation-state
with regard to labour demands.
Meanings of illegality
The literature on migrants’ illegality focuses on two main issues. On the one hand,
some scholars analyse the implications of legal exclusion with regard to illegal
immigrants’ lives. These writers speak, for example, of how the category of ‘illegal’
tends to construct a subordinate labour force, pure manpower without access to
social services and facilities, or non-legal subjects (homo sacer, in Giorgio
Agamben’s words), a status under which everything (or almost everything) would
seem possible. On the other hand, different authors have brought out the ways in
which illegal immigrants are incorporated through informal, every day practises.
This strand of the literature is concerned with how individual and collective coping
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strategies, of the migrants themselves, non-governmental organisations, and
sympathetic civil servants have paved the way for an opening up of loopholes for
illegal immigrants in the job market or in the realm of the welfare state. From a
comparative standpoint, the present study is a blend of both types of research.
With regard to the first matter, suffice to say that illegality does not always mean
confinement to a subordinate identity or imprisonment within the bounds of non-
recognition. Better said, it is not always more the case than it is with legality. In
Malaysia, the resort to illegality, both by people who entered the country illegally
and those who became illegal immigrants on leaving their employers, has made it
possible for people to ‘escape’ the restraints imposed by the state-regulated migrant
labour system. To be more concise, illegal immigrants, unlike ‘legal’ immigrants,
can change jobs, can to some extent negotiate their salary and working conditions,
do not have to pay extra to enter or remain in the country and can prolong their stay
independently of the economic situation or their state of health, or beyond the
5 years stipulated by law (Kassim 1995: 12–15; Wong and Anwar 2003: 220). In this
regard, and in contrast with what has been observed in Europe and the United States,
illegality can also constitute a form of resistance. A form of resistance that is, in fact,
not so different from the kinds of resistance adopted by Malay peasants as described
by James Scott (1985). This resistance is not organised or collective by nature and
neither is it verbalised or staged in any way, but rather it is carried out on the basis of
small, everyday, individual actions, on the basis of leading an invisible—or
invisibilised—existence which, precisely as such, contrives to escape from, and
thereby reveal itself to, state control.
As for the dichotomy between exclusion in the formal sphere and inclusion in the
informal one, the Spanish case is paradigmatic in the way its legal system at once
excludes and includes. By this I mean the way in which ‘the tension between illegal
status and certain citizenship rights does not always set up an opposition between
formal law, on the one hand, and informal practises, on the other: it is always located
within the law itself’ (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas forthcoming). First of all,
while illegal immigrants are undocumented on the national level (by the central
government), their registration in the municipal census (in Spanish, el padrón)
documents them at the local level. Second, while legal and political processes were
including illegal immigrants in some spheres of the social domain, in terms of work,
they still fell into the category of legally non-existent, and hence right-less
manpower. This flexible line between exclusion and inclusion, between outside
and inside, reveals how illegality should be understood as a differentiated form of
inclusion rather than as absolute shutting out. Furthermore, it makes it possible to
identify the more sheltered or protected aspects of citizenship. In particular, in the
Spanish case, it would seem clear that the borderlines that affect illegal immigrants
are much less permeable in the national domain and with respect to the labour
market than in the local domain and with respect to the welfare state.
Finally, if we compare the meanings of illegality in Malaysia and Spain, it is
important to identify a number of major differences and similarities. If illegality is
defined as an in-between state of regularise ability (the possibility of being
regularised) and deportability (the possibility of being deported), we could conclude
that the situation of illegal immigrants would tend more to deportability in Malaysia
and more to regularise ability in Spain. Another difference between the two countries
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is connected with the relationship between legality and illegality. In Malaysia,
illegality should be understood above all as an alternative to legality (with regard
to both arrival and stay) while in Spain it is more like a path or form of access
to legality. This is to say that, in contrast with Malaysia, illegality in Spain has
ended up representing a transition, path or requisite for legality. Despite all these
fundamental differences, both cases make it clear how legal status and illegal
status are not fixed. On the contrary, immigrants move from one status to the
other (from legality to illegality in Malaysia, and from illegality to legality and
vice-versa in Spain) with relative ease. Finally, in both cases, one can see that to
speak of illegality is also to speak of what might be called the theatre of
illegality, which is to say, of the staging of migratory control over the illegal
immigrant.
As De Genova (2002: 436–437) has made clear for the case of the United States,
this staging (or show) of migratory control is mainly carried out by means of arrests,
detentions and deportations. It is by deprivation of free movement and forced
physical expulsion that state control is deployed in its most heightened expression. If
in the sphere of labour the illegal immigrant is stripped of his or her rights as a
worker, with deportation he or she is directly dispossessed of freedom of movement
(De Genova 2009). The aim of deportation policies is not so much to reduce illegal
immigration as to delimit a symbolic precinct of illegality. While this is common to
both Malaysia and Spain, the basic difference between the two countries is to be
found in the geographic domain or space in which the illegality show is staged. In
Malaysia, deportation policies are put into practise at the very heart of national
territory. In Spain, they are carried out in particular on the geographic frontier and
beyond. This difference between the geographies of deportability suggests that the
deportees are different in each case. In Malaysia, essentially workers are deported,
while in Spain deportation is mostly applied—and one might almost say in a
preventive fashion—to those who have not yet managed to get in.
Toward a theory of borders and confines
A comparison between two such different countries (which, however, are much more
alike than one might expect), clearly shows how borders act in very different ways
or, to be more specific, have different implications and meanings when considered in
the light of migratory flows. Although this factor goes well beyond the scope of this
study, I would like to sketch what we might call an incipient theory of borders and
confines. By border I understand the territory where one state ends and another
begins, or the geographic line between different states. By confine I mean, using the
term and definition of Mezzadra (2005: 112), the ‘line of division and protection of
constituted and consolidated political, social and symbolic spaces’. Thinking about
borders and confines from a comparative point of view, this study shows that what is
engraved on the experience of immigrants is mainly the confine in the case of
Malaysia and mainly the border in that of Spain.
In Malaysia the geographic border is not erected as a wall separating those inside
from those outside. Through the country’s airports or aboard small boats, legal and
illegal immigrants cross the borders of Malaysia without much difficulty. Once they
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are inside, however, the confine is imposed on both groups. In the case of legal
immigrants, the confine is established when they are immobilised in the job market,
made dependent on their employers, and defined as purely and exclusively
temporary labour. In brief, the confine of legality is marked by the idea of reducing
legal immigrants to the condition of being mere ‘foreign workers’. As for illegal
immigrants, the confine is constructed over the threat of deportation, or the
possibility of being physically ‘expelled’ from national territory in a more than less
judicial and more than less arbitrary fashion. In this regard, we might conclude, as I
have argued elsewhere (Garcés-Mascareñas 2010), that what marks the experience of
immigrants is not so much crossing the border (legally or illegally) as being on the
outside even when physically inside.
In Spain—and this point can be extended to most Western countries—it is
especially on the border where the largest scale and most frequent forms of exclusion
occur. It is at the border, and even beyond it, in the countries of origin, where the
meagre trickle of those who may enter are separated from those who may not or
where those who seem to be trying to get in anyway are rejected and turned back. In
other words, in contrast with Malaysia, it is especially on the border where not only
the illegality show is staged but also the ultimate performance of immigration policies.
In fact, the dominance of the border over the confine is a form of excluding immigrants
where exclusion is still possible, which is to say, where the state can still get around the
constraints imposed by the legal and political systems. From this point of viewwemight
conclude that the relationship between border and confine is not only connected with the
nature of the nation-state (in the post-colonial states such Malaysia frontier territories
have remained to a large extent at a great remove from the interests of the national elites
installed in the centre) or with the greater influence of factor markets in migration
policymaking processes (favouring the entry of workers) but also with the role played by
rights (and their application) within national territory.
It would be too simple to conclude, however, that the confine is characteristic of
non-democratic or autocratic countries while the border is imposed as the only form
of exclusion in liberal democracies. On the one hand, in Spain there are also
significant confines that affect both legal and illegal immigrants. The difference with
Malaysia does not lie so much in the existence or absence of the confine but rather in
its duration. In other words, the important fact is not that, in Spain, there has been no
exclusion from within, but that it has only been possible to enforce this exclusion
during the first years in the country. In the long term, both legal and illegal
immigrants have ended up being recognised as permanent residents or fully fledged
citizens. On the other hand, several studies (Balibar 2001; Bigo 2002; Salter 2004;
Mezzadra 2005; Walters 2006) have signalled an increasing tendency towards ‘de-
localisation’, ‘de-territorialisation’ or ‘disegregation’ from the border inwards.
Hence, along with the reinforcement of exterior walls and the externalisation of
the border towards the countries of origin, another ‘border that is implosive,
infinitely elastic, and in effect, truly everywhere, within the space of the nation-state’
(De Genova 2009: 30) would also be under construction. It remains to be seen how
far it is possible to go with this exclusion from within, and to what extent rights, or
the rule of law, do play the fundamental role that many have attributed to them.
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Conclusions
States are confronted with a dilemma when regulating labour migration: while
markets require a policy of open borders to provide as many migrant workers
as demanded, citizenship seems to require some degree of closure to the outside
so as to protect the economic, social, political and cultural boundaries of the
nation-state. As pointed out by Bader (1995: 212), the tendency toward
universalist inclusion within states is intrinsically interwoven with systematic
exclusion of those categorised as non-members, non-citizens or foreigners. While
in Malaysia this dilemma between markets and citizenship was attempted to be
solved by limiting rights instead of numbers, in Spain this was done by limiting
numbers instead of rights. Despite this difference, both states have operated under
the assumption that this dilemma could be solved by ‘managing’ immigration as an
economic matter, that is, by considering immigrants as pure labour that could be
subjected to multiple barriers. However, in both cases this has proven to be an
illusion that ended up in what I described as state’s production of migrants
illegality. From this perspective, illegal migration is thus not the consequence of
ineffective, failed or inherently flawed immigration policies but rather the result of
the intractable antagonism between demands for migrant labour and demands for
closure.
While both Malaysia and Spain are clear examples of the state’s production
of migrants’ illegality, the second question to be considered is what illegality
means. The comparison between both cases allows us to reconsider current
conceptualisations on illegal migration. First, illegality mirrors legality. While in
the case of Malaysia illegality makes it possible for migrants to escape the
restraints imposed on legal migrants, in Spain illegality has been the mainly
path to later access to legality. In other words, in Malaysia illegality often
represents a way to escape from State control. In Spain, illegality is presented
as a sin demanding reparation (thus legal recognition) through good moral and
economic performance (see Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas forthcoming).
Second, deportation policies delimit the symbolic precinct of illegality in both
cases and, in consequence, the boundary that places ‘illegals’ as definitively
outsiders or deportable subjects. While in Malaysia this boundary is placed within
the national territory, in Spain rights’ constraints have displaced the exercise of this
symbolic precinct at the margins of the territory, that is, at the geographic borders
and beyond. This means that while in Malaysia deportation is exercised upon
migrant workers, in Spain this is mainly imposed on those who have not yet
managed to get in. Once they are in, illegality is not anymore synonymous with
deportability but rather becomes a form of subordinated inclusion in the long and
often winding path toward legality.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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